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 This research was conducted to determine the effect of institutional 
ownership, blockholder ownership and the Board’s tenure on 
disclosure of corporate governance in Indonesia. The population is all 
publicly listed companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and 
samples were taken using purposive sampling techniques to produce a 
total of 152 companies in the period 2016-2017. Using the multiple 
linear regression test, the results show that institutional ownership and 
blockholder ownership have a positive effect on corporate governance 
disclosure, while there is no effect of the Board’s  tenure on corporate 
governance. 
This is an open access article under the CC–BY-SA license. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is the management of a business activity oriented to value creation that is 
not only short term, but sustainable. The existence of good corporate governance is crucial for the 
sake of a business activity that still stands and operates in a sustainable manner as well. (Madhani, 
2015b). Madhani (2015b) also revealed that governance is not only limited to its implementation, but 
also how a business entity proves the implementation, namely through disclosure. Disclosure of 
important matters that are true, relevant and accurate as well as paying attention to aspects of time 
allows stakeholders to assess how management works. Compliance with governance can be an 
important factor behind a company's success (Fung 2014). And compliance and performance can be 
seen and assessed from the disclosures or disclosures listed in the company's annual report published 
annually.This shows the level of transparency expressed by a company. 
In order to convince interested parties that the company does have a good corporate governance 
structure, transparency is needed (Grassa&Chakroun 2016). So that stakeholders can assess the work 
of a management, it will be greatly helped by the disclosure of important information which is of 
course accurate, responding to what stakeholders want to know and issued at the right time (Madhani 
2015a).On July 29, 2016, Financial Services Authority Regulation established regulations, namely 
POJK Number 29 / POJK.04 / 2016 concerning Annual Reports of Issuers or Public Companies. In 
Article 4 it is stated that the annual report of a public company must contain the said corporate 
governance. Then there is Regulation Number 30 / SOJK.04 / 2016 regarding the Form and Content 
of Annual Reports of Issuers or Public Companies that were issued on August 3, 2016. This research 
focuses on the influence of institutional ownership, blockholder ownership and the the Board’s tenure 
on disclosure of governance companies in public companies in Indonesia. 
The ownership structure and term of office of the Board are expected to increase the value of 
the company. Both of these elements are thought to be able to reduce the conflict of interest that 
occurs between shareholders and company management, because these two elements are closely 
related to how the company is managed. Lakhal (2006) argues that institutional ownership can 
encourage the achievement of good corporate governance. This is based on the assumption that an 
institution has a level of caution and good judgment in making decisions, so that when an institution 
has a sharing of interests in a company, it is expected that the management of the company will be 
good because of good supervision. Such conditions also occur in blockholder ownership. 
Blockholder ownership shows a certain concentration in the company's ownership structure, 
where the ownership of the shares is concentrated in certain parties who have shares above 5%. This 
condition will affect the management of the company. because the majority shareholders already have 
comprehensive access to company information. Another thing that is also thought to influence the 
disclosure of corporate governance is the term of office of the Board. The length of the term of office, 
is closely related to the increasing level of experience and knowledge. The higher level of experience 
and knowledge possessed by the Board, is expected to further enhance its ability to manage the 
company. One indicator of good company management is transparency, which in this case is the 
disclosure of corporate governance. 
Research on the influence of institutional ownership, blockholder ownership and the term of 
office of the Board on the unfolding of corporate governance, has been carried out by previous 
researchers. However, this study has a difference that is at the same time a renewal, where this study 
uses a disclosure index issued by the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), which consists of 52 items. To the best of the researchers' knowledge, the use of this 
index has not been widely used by researchers in Indonesia, because there is an assumption that there 
is an irrelevance in some disclosure items issued by UNCTAD with the conditions of companies in 
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Indonesia. However, researchers have other considerations in the use of the index issued by 
UNCTAD, where this index is more internationally accepted. 
2. Literature Review 
Institutional ownership is the proportion of share ownership by shareholders in the form of an 
institution. In general, when compared to individual shareholders, institutions have much better 
supervisory abilities on the performance of a company (Shleifer &Vishny 1986). Conversely, 
individual shareholders with shares that are not as large as the property of institutions, do not have 
equal ability to collect and obtain information that can make them monitor and control the behavior of 
company management (Stiglitz 1985). The impetus for institutional shareholders to always supervise 
management behavior tends to be large because the proportion of their share ownership is relatively 
larger than that of individual shareholders (Jensen 1993b). 
Solomon,et al. (2002) explained that institutional shareholders have a crucial role in equalizing 
the interests of shareholders with company management. Voluntary disclosure by companies can be a 
means of aligning interests between the two parties (Eng&Mak 2003). Institutional shareholders have 
more motivation to oversee management behavior because the proportion of their share ownership is 
relatively greater than individual shareholders (Jensen 1993b). Conversely, shareholders in the form 
of individuals who have a relatively small proportion of ownership have an ability that cannot match 
institutional shareholders to collect and obtain information that can make them monitor and control 
the behavior of company management (Stiglitz 1985). 
Judging from agency theory, institutional shareholders play an important role in overseeing 
company management because of its greater ability to carry out these supervisory actions. In addition, 
institutional shareholders also tend to have majority voting rights, so they are able to oversee 
management's actions in more depth. This will encourage management to make disclosures to reduce 
agency conflicts. Research by Al-Bassam, et al. (2015) found that there was a positive effect of 
institutional ownership on disclosure of corporate governance. The greater the share of institutional 
ownership, the better the disclosure of governance. Based on this explanation, this study hypothesizes 
that: 
H1: Institutional ownership has a positive effect on disclosure of corporate governance. 
According to Edmans (2014), blockholders are large shareholders in a company. Edmans 
(2014) states that blockholders have a crucial role in governance, because the size of their shares in 
the company gives impetus to bear the costs incurred for monitoring activities. Same is the case with 
Dou et al. (2016) which says when shareholders do not have a majority interest, it will be less 
economical for individual shareholders to incur significant monitoring costs, because the benefits they 
will receive tend to be small. For this reason, blockholders can help improve reporting quality and 
transparency. The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the block at least 5% of the total issued 
shares is used to measure the variable ownership of the blockholders. 
The theoretical framework developed by Jensen &Meckling (1976), based on agency theory 
and ownership structure, plays a central role in the corporate governance literature. Bonazzi& Islam 
(2007) argues that effective control mechanisms that can reduce agency costs and force managers to 
act in the interests of shareholders have become a major concern for corporate governance. Likewise, 
Jensen (1993a) argues that ownership structure is an important element in corporate control and 
governance. 
According to Edmans (2014), the important role played by blockholders motivates them to pay 
for monitoring or monitoring of the company's management performance. In line with Edmans 
(2014), and Dou,et al. (2016) explained, when shareholders do not have a majority interest, it is less 
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economical for individual shareholders to incur significant monitoring costs, because they will only 
receive a small benefit. Thus, blockholders can help improve reporting quality and transparency. 
The results of empirical studies on the effect of blockholder ownership on corporate 
governance disclosure cannot be concluded. For example, Gan,et al. (2013) observed a positive 
relationship in companies registered in Malaysia. In contrast, Al-Bassam,et al. (2015) shows that 
blocking has a significant negative effect on disclosure of governance in companies registered in 
Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Nerantzidis&Tsamis (2017) did not find any influence from blockholder 
ownership on disclosure of corporate governance. 
In Indonesia, the Financial Services Authority Regulation, POJK No. 11/ 2017 requires 
members of the board to report for ownership of at least 5% of paid up capital in a publicly listed 
company. Given the effectiveness of blockholders as a corporate governance tool, and their ability to 
exert pressure on managers to increase accountability, transparency and disclosure practices, it is 
hoped that a higher proportion of blockholder ownership is associated with good corporate 
governance disclosure. Thus, the hypotheses compiled are: 
H2: Blockholder ownership has a positive effect on corporate governance disclosure. 
The term of office can be interpreted as the span of time a person has to hold a position. Byrd,et 
al. (2010) stated that the relatively longstanding relationship between the board tended to increase the 
existence of agency problems and reduce the course of supervision from the board. However, Vafeas 
(2003) explained that a board with a long period of time can actually grow a knowledge of the 
company and change its business activities for the better. On the one hand, the close relationship with 
the directors also does not mean good, even the objectivity of supervision will be threatened. In this 
study, the term of office is how long the board has served in the company as measured by the average 
number of years of the board working in the company. 
Berberich&Niu (2011) found councils with long tenure had a negative impact on governance, 
because effectiveness in supervision of management would be reduced. A different conclusion is 
found in other studies, that a long tenure means the council will become more critical, rather than a 
short tenure (Bebchuk& Cohen 2003). A board with a long term of office also means that it has more 
interaction and information (Rutherford &Buchholtz 2007).Research conducted on the effect of the 
term of office of the board on disclosure of corporate social responsibility, with characteristics similar 
to disclosure of corporate governance, shows the results that the board’s tenure has a negative effect 
on CSR disclosures that are voluntary (Sari,et al. 2016). This study supports the previous research 
conducted by Vafeas (2003) and Byrd, et al. (2010). Therefore, the hypotheses compiled are: 
H3: The Board’s tenure has a negative effect on disclosure of corporate governance. 
3. Research Method 
The population used in this study is all listed companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
with purposive sampling criteria including; (1) publicly listed companies that publish annual reports 
for the 2016-2017 period, and (2) publicly listed companies that publish sufficient information 
regarding share ownership and terms of office of the Board. The Board and disclosure of corporate 
governance along with their operational definitions are in the following Table 1. 
Table 1. Definition of Variable Operations 
Type Name Opeartional Definition 
Dependent Disclosure of Corporate 
Governance 
disclosure of corporate governance (which is a 
recommendation index by UNCTAD (The United 
Nations Conference of Trade and Development), 
consisting of 52 items (UNCTAD, 2011) 
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Independent Institusional ownership 
(INST) 
Number of company shares owned by the institution 
(Deumes and Knechel, 2008) 
 Blockholder ownership 
(BLOCK) 
Share ownership of 5% or more (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) 
 The Board’s tenure 
(TENURE) 
Average time (years) of terms of service for members 
of the Board (Oliveira, et al. 2016) 
The use of the recommendation index by UNCTAD (2011) is based on an analysis conducted 
by the agency involving Indonesia, so that it is relevant if used in research focusing on companies in 
Indonesia. The analytical tool used is multiple linear regression analysis to find the effect of 
independent variables on the dependent (Ghozali, 2011) with the following models: 
CGD = α + β1 (INST) + β2 (BLOCK) + β3 (TENURE) + 𝜀 
Notifications 
CGD : disclosure of corporate governance 
INST :Institusional ownership 
BLOCK :Blockholder ownership 
TENURE : The Board’s tenure 
α  :Constan 
β  : Regression coefficient 
ε  :Standarderror 
Before testing the hypothesis with multiple linear regression, the data feasibility test is first 
performed through the normality test and the linearity test. Then multicollinearity test, 
heteroscedasticity test and autocorrelation test are also carried out to ensure the feasibility of the data. 
Testing the model is analyzed by determination, F test and t test to find out how much influence the 
independent variables have on the dependent variable. 
4. Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistical testing was first carried out, showing the results of the average corporate 
governance disclosures (CGD) conducted by companies in Indonesia that were included in the sample 
were still relatively low, ie 28 items out of a total of 52 items recommended in the UNCTAD index, 
with the most disclosure is 36 items and the lowest is only 18 items. Institutional ownership (INST) 
has a fairly high average of 76.2, with the lowest value 0 and the highest 99.8. Unlike institutional 
ownership, blockholder ownership (BLOCK) has an average of only 0.7, with a maximum value of 1 
and a minimum of 0. Finally, the Board’s tenure (TENURE) has an average value of 6.7 years, with 
tenure the shortest 0.08 years and the longest 27.5 years. 
Before testing multiple linear regression analysis, a classic assumption test is performed. The 
result, the data is seen following a diagonal line in multivariate normality tests, also testing with 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov shows a value of 0.054, which means the data has been normally distributed. 
Multicollinearity test by looking at the Tolerance value, none of which reached 0.1, and the value of 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), none of which reached 10, indicating that there are no independent 
variables that correlate strongly with each other. 
Heteroscedasticity testing with scatterplot shows that the data has spread. Supporting 
scatterplots, the Glejser test was carried out and it was seen that there were no variables that had a 
significance level below 0.05, meaning that the data was free from heteroscedasticity. Finally, the 
autocorrelation test is performed by looking at the Durbin-Watson value, amounting to 2.047, which 
means that the data is free from positive or negative autocorrelation. 
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The coefficient of determination obtained by 23.1, which means that the independent variables 
can explain the dependent variable by 23.1%, while the other 76.9% is explained by other 
factors.Tests with multiple linear regression analysis show the following results: 
Tabel 2. Result 
 
 
CGD = 3,114 + 0,001 INST+ 0,254 BLOCK– 0,001 TENURE + 𝜀 
Hypothesis 1, that has been formulated namely; institutional ownership has a positive effect on 
corporate governance disclosure. From the test results with multiple linear regression analysis, the 
results obtained t value of 1.446 and a significance value of 0.011, below 0.05. This shows that 
hypothesis 1 is accepted; institutional ownership has a positive effect on corporate governance 
disclosure. According to agency theory, institutional shareholders play an important role in overseeing 
company management because of their greater ability to carry out these supervisory actions. In 
addition, institutional shareholders also tend to have majority voting rights, so they are able to oversee 
management's actions in more depth. This will encourage management to disclose internal controls to 
reduce agency conflicts. This finding supports the results of research by Al-Bassam,et al. (2015) 
which states that institutional shareholders play an important role in overseeing company 
performance, because they have majority voting rights and access to management through special 
information channels. 
Hypothesis 2, that has been formulated namely; blockholder ownership has a positive effect on 
corporate governance disclosure. From the test results with multiple linear regression analysis, the 
results obtained t value of 2.291 and a significance value of 0.001, below 0.05. This shows that 
hypothesis 2 is accepted; Blockholder ownership has a positive effect on corporate governance 
disclosure. Agency theory argues that effective controls that can reduce agency costs and force 
managers to act in the interests of shareholders have become a major concern for corporate 
governance. Edmans (2014) claims that blockholders, play an important role in governance, because 
the size of their shares in the company provides an impetus to bear the costs of monitoring managers. 
This finding supports the results of research by Gan,et al (2013) which states that higher blockholder 
ownership offers what investors want, in the form of better supervision and discipline of managers. 
Hypothesis 3, which has been formulated namely; the Board’s tenure has a negative effect on 
disclosure of corporate governance. From the test results with multiple linear regression analysis, the 
results obtained t value of -0,001| and the significance value of 0.692, above 0.05. This shows that 
hypothesis 3 is rejected; there is no influence from the Board of Commissioners' tenure with 
disclosure of corporate governance. Whether or not the average Board has no effect on the level of 
corporate governance disclosure. 
5. Conclusion 
This study was able to find the influence of variables related to share ownership; namely 
institutional ownership and blockholder ownership, both of which have a positive influence on 
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disclosure of corporate governance. Ownership by institutions, is considered capable of increasing 
disclosure of corporate governance because in general it is the majority ownership. So that it 
automatically has a majority vote and can control the performance of management to fit the agreed 
goals. Blockholder ownership, which also has a positive effect on corporate governance, is considered 
to be able to increase corporate governance disclosure because it provides an impetus for block 
owners to bear the costs of monitoring the manager's performance, because their shares are classified 
as high, so they are very dependent on the company's performance. alone. However, the Board’s 
tenure variable failed to explain the disclosure of corporate governance. The findings of the study did 
not show any significant effect of these variables. 
Research Limitations and Suggestions 
There are several limitations in this study, namely the research only focuses on three 
independent variables; institutional ownership, blockholder ownership and the Board’s tenure, which 
cumulatively influences 23.1% of the dependent variable; disclosure of corporate governance. 
Another 76.9% cannot be covered by this study. It is expected that future research on similar topics 
will add more independent variables from various aspects so that they can further explain the 
dependent variable further. 
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